I’ve been kind of interested in Peter Leithart for a
couple of years now. Although the whole milieu and ethos of the
ultra-confessional Reformed is of course not my thing, Leithart’s ideas and
especially his interests are rather consistently appealing to me. I greatly
enjoyed his book on St Constantine last year, and also read bits and pieces of
Against Christianity. [1] But what I really wanted to read was Deep Exegesis:
The Mystery of Reading Scripture, recommended to me by the great Esteban
Vazquez, who used to blog at Voice of Stefan. In the course of working on the
Lewis paper mentioned here, I finally
borrowed a copy from the OCU library, and finished reading it on Saturday.
Essentially what Leithart is up to is arguing for
something very like the mediaeval quadriga. While there are a few references to
the Fathers, however, he doesn’t really mention this until the epilogue, where
he writes, ‘First, the hermeneutical method offered here is very similar to the
fourfold method developed by medieval Bible teachers.’ [2] In other words, Leithart
is not explicitly advocating a return to Patristic or mediaeval exegesis. This
has the virtue of perhaps appealing to those who would be immediately inimical
to such a project and hopefully persuading them. But unfortunately, it also
gives the book the feel of an effort to reinvent the wheel at times.
What we are told up front—in the ‘Preface’—is that Leithart
has two aims: ‘to show that a hermeneutics of the letter [which he advocates]
ought not to be a rigidly literalist hermeneutics’, and ‘to learn to read from
Jesus and Paul’. [3] As humdrum as these may sound though, they are also ways
of restating the strengths of Patristic exegesis. With regard to the first
point, John J. O’Keefe and R.R. Reno (apologies to those who do not care for
the latter, but it’s such a good book!) demonstrate unambiguously, ‘For the
church fathers, a faith that Jesus Christ fulfills the scriptures [the warrant
for typological reading] did not supersede or make unnecessary the difficult
task of struggling with the literal details of the Bible.’ [4] With regard to
the second point, learning to ‘read from Jesus and Paul’ is of course precisely
what the Fathers did. As an illustration of the kind of problematic assumptions
he is opposing, Leithart quotes Richard Longenecker’s ‘widely quoted passage’
claiming that modern readers must not attempt to ‘reproduce the exegesis of the
New Testament’. [5] O’Keefe and Reno, however, read Patristic exegesis merely
as an extension, a ‘reproduction’ to use Longenecker’s term, of NT exegesis. [6]
Learning to ‘read from Jesus and Paul’ can and should mean learning to read
from the Fathers. Otherwise, we’re pursuing the hermeneutical equivalent of the
Protestant attempts to rebuilt the NT Church from scratch.
Moving along then, Leithart’s preface points out two
further things about the book: he believes, and hopes to demonstrate, that NT
exegesis is not merely ‘some bizarre form of sacred hermeneutics’, but a
legitimate way of approaching the reading of any text, sacred or ‘secular’.
Finally, he notes that he will refer to John 9 (the healing of the man born blind)
throughout as a supreme example of what he’s talking about, since it ‘superbly
embodies many of the points I want to make about texts and reading’. [7]
Unfortunately, Chapter 1 gets off to a slow start.
It is Leithart’s attempt to explain historically what has gone wrong with
modern exegesis, whether liberal and academic or evangelical and popular. What
has gone wrong is that the text has become a ‘husk’ which we can and should
separate from the ‘kernel’ of its meaning. Leithart traces this notion from
Lodewijk Meyer’s 17th-c. application of Cartesianism to the
Scriptures—since for Meyer biblical truth ‘is found in the rationally
justifiable message and not in the rustic letter’ [8]—all the way up to Richard
Longenecker, for whom the ‘kernel of doctrine is detached from the husk of Paul’s
puzzling and odd, if entertaining, rhetoric and dialectic’. [9] It is certainly
one way to explain and understand the modern impasse, but I found the chapter a
bit tedious. More importantly, one wonders whether some of the blame at least
ought not to be placed on the Reformers’ ‘abandonment of medieval modes of
reading’—Leithart leaves the impression that this had no effect on Protestant
hermeneutics until Descartes and Meyer came along. [10] Certainly, I wonder
whether Descartes, Spinoza, and Kant—all of whom come up for blame—aren’t
something more like the symptom than the disease. As Leithart notes in his
comments on Meyer, the latter was attempting to ‘address the lamentable
diversity of Protestant interpretation’. This diversity, according to Meyer
(and Leithart?), arose from the false or at least exaggerated doctrines of Scipture’s perspicuity or
clarity of meaning, and of its self-interpreting ability. [11] Of course,
although Leithart does not dwell on the point, both of these ideas were
attempts to develop a hermeneutics that could dispense with Tradition. Perhaps
I have missed something, but is not clear to me whether our author shares Meyer’s
skepticism concerning the Reformers’ doctrines, even if not his Cartesian
alternative to them.
Chapter 2, ‘Texts Are Events: Typology’, is more
exciting. Leithart takes stock of other attempts to justify the NT exegesis of
the OT (whether they advocate ‘reproducing’ it or not), and concludes that they
all end with a ‘sacred hermeneutics, applicable to the single double-authored,
inspired text of the Bible but inapplicable to every other text’. But Leithart,
naturally enough I think, finds this unsatisfactory. He thinks it is ‘possible
to justify apostolic reading—which I will call typological—with an argument
that applies to texts as such, or at least to all texts of major importance’. [12]
This argument is based on those, first, of Arthur C. Danto that the
significance and description of past events necessarily grows richer as their
consequences develop and they enter into complex relationships with other
events, and second, of David Weberman (named in the footnotes) that particular,
supposedly finished ‘Events themselves change over time, taking on new
properties because of later events.’ [13] To illustrate and explain this
potentially counter-intuitive claim, Leithart borrows Weberman’s example of a
shooting that takes place at 10 am, the victim of which doesn’t die until 1 pm.
The ‘historical’ description of the event at 10, if isolated from later
developments, is going to be terribly unsatisfying—it is only a shooting. But
when the victim dies, the shooting actually becomes a murder.
Leithart initially compares this with the effect of
Christ’s death and resurrection on the story of Abraham’s sacrifice of Isaac: ‘It
becomes a promise of Jesus, the crucified and risen Messiah, a type and
foreshadowing of the great deliverance on Golgotha, the final sacrifice.’ [14] But
of course, he is arguing that all texts are events, not just biblical ones.
Thus, about five pages use Ian McEwan’s Atonement and Cormac McCarthy’s No
Country for Old Men to show that Danto’s and Weberman’s insights apply to
novels every bit as much as to the Bible. [15] He draws on David Steinmetz’s
comparison of NT exegesis to the generic mystery-story device of the detective
explaining earlier, puzzling events in the story by means of a ‘second
narrative’ that unlocks their meaning. [16] But Leithart also turns twice to
John 9 to demonstrate the application of his arguments to Scripture as the text
par excellence.
Chapter 3 is entitled ‘Words Are Players: Semantics’—emphasising
the claim that words ‘do the unexpected, or do the expected in unexpected ways’,
[17] contra those who take their semantic cues primarily from the lexicographer’s
project of narrowing and isolating synchronic meanings [18] rather than the
poet’s of reveling in multivalence and diachronic resonance. Leithart writes:
Words are round characters. Many words have a variety of meanings, and even those that have only a single lexical meaning have a variety of associations and connotations. These dimensions might not be connected to one another in any obvious way....When we read a text, especially one with a high level of craftsmanship, we should be alert to the possibility that a covert sense is lurking just under the surface of the overt. [19]
As evidence, Leithart draws on Dylan Thomas’s ‘Fern
Hill’ and Seamus Heaney’s ‘Anahorish’, also referring to King Lear a number of
times throughout the chapter. He also draws examples from ancient, non-biblical
literature—such as Homer [20]—to counter the claim that ‘Appeal to etymology,
and to word formation, is...always dangerous.’ [21] Leithart even does ‘the
unexpected’ himself when he quotes the words ‘tit’ and ‘c-nt’ in a reference to
Philip Roth’s shocking Sabbath’s Theater. [22] And finally, of course, he turns
to John 9 once again, where examples of all of the things he’s talking about
abound.
Although—judging by the title—one feels that Chapter
3 could have devolved into mere siliness, this is perhaps even more true of Chapter
4, ‘The Text Is a Joke: Intertextuality’. But what he means is ‘every text
depends for its meaning on information lying outside the text...and a good
interpreter is...one with a broad knowledge and the wit to know what bits of
knowledge are relevant. All interpretation is a matter of getting it. All texts
mean the way jokes mean.’ [23] This of course in response to the obsessive concern
in historical-critical exegesis with avoiding eisegesis, and the concomitant
charge that ‘pre-critical’, and one fears, perhaps even any kind of faith-based
reading are often guilty of eisegetical readings. After the initial, obviously ‘joke’
examples, and brief considerations of a few biblical passages, Leithart looks
at the use of the Bible itself in The Merchant of Venice, and of Dante in Eliot’s ‘The
Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock’, and how Shakespeare and Eliot depend for
their meaning on the two earlier works. [24] In John 9, he begins with
intertextual references to earlier portions of St John’s Gospel itself, before
expanding the analysis with Genesis, Isaiah, and Psalm 40.
Here, Leithart interrupts himself briefly to
consider the eisegetical problem from another point of view: the supposed
contrast between the ‘subjective’ methods of literary interpretation and those
of the ‘harder’ disciplines. Drawing on N.T. Wright, he notes that ‘there is
always an imaginative leap involved in forming a hypothesis that puts facts
into a coherent narrative’, whether the ‘facts’ are literary or scientific. [25]
The test is still the ability of the reading to explain the pattern of the
data. Furthermore, if such leaps were never taken in any discipline, the result
would extremely unsatisfying. Nevertheless, the leaps depend on attention to
the ‘facts’, in the present case, the texts, from which the leap is made, and
Leithart acknowledges that historical context and conventions provide
restraints on reading. [26]
Chapter 5, ‘Texts Are Music—Structure’, was perhaps
next to Chapter 1 my least favourite. Leithart compares texts to music in the
sense that both exhibit complex structures made up of layers of meaning—a good
interpreter ‘must develop an ear for the multiple melodies, not to mention the
complex rhythms, of texts’. [27] It is an excellent analogy, and the result—applied
to the Odyssey on pp. 152-3, Joyce’s Ulysses and Portrait of the Artist as a
Young Man on pp. 159-61, and John 9 on 161-71—is fairly impressive. The problem
is that Leithart’s exploration of the musical analogy takes so long! He begins
on p. 144 by answering Victor Zuckerkandl’s overstatement of the uniqueness of
repetition in music as an art form, and proceeds through an overly long
analysis of Bach’s ‘Minuet in G’, occupying pp. 146-9. The point is made, but
at the expense of my desire to keep paying attention.
The final chapter, ‘Texts Are about Christ:
Application’, argues not only the obvious—‘Scripture is about Christ’—but the
less obvious as well: Scripture is about totus Christus, which means it’s about
the Church as Christ’s Body; and other texts (like Oedipus Rex), and indeed,
all of history, are about Christ too. The ecclesiastical emphasis of this totus
Christus exegesis prompts perhaps Leithart’s longest quotations from the
Fathers—St Augustine’s On Christian Teaching on p. 173 and St Ambrose’s Letter
67 on p. 179. It also suggests a much earlier analysis of John 9 than other
chapters, focusing on the blind man as a type of the Church and the washing as
a type of Baptism. I have already quoted from the section ‘Jesus and Oedipus’
(here, in the post on St Eustathius), but the reading of Oedipus really is
quite striking, being tied into John 9 by the theme of blindness. [28]
But at this point, Leithart begins a section
entitled ‘Enlightenment Ocularcentrism’. Starting with a solid quotation from
Nietzsche’s Birth of Tragedy, and moving through the always culpable Descartes,
Frances Yates on the ‘spatialized view of knowledge’ resulting from the ars
memoriae, Walter Ong on Peter Ramus’s pedagogy, and a nod toward postmodern
echoes of Nietzsche’s critique of the Enlightenment, I believe that Leithart is
setting up a demonstration that in John 9 we see the totus Christus as the
answer to mistaken notions of light, vision, and understanding in the West. The
whole passage is, I’m afraid, a little ambiguous though. Leithart acknowledges
that St John too displays an ocularcentrism, though one focused on Christ the
Logos rather than Enlightenment rationality, [29] but still it is hard to determine
precisely where he may or may not disagree with the essentially Nietzschean and
postmodernist critiques he has offered in the preceding pages. In the next
section, ‘Politics of Sight’ [30], we are on firmer ground as Leithart extends the
discovery of totus Christus and the reading of John 9 to a consideration of the
overturning of worldly power and political structures. Leithart concludes the
chapter with the following comments:
John 9, in short, opens up an angle for literary analysis, a critique of Enlightenment rationality, and some features of Christian politics. It is about Jesus; it is about the Jesus who is the head of the body, and so is about the whole Christ. It is about the Jesus who is head over all things for his church, the one in whom everything holds together. John 9 is a text about everything, just like every other biblical text. [31]
The epilogue consists of three areas of brief musings
that fell outside the scope of the book: the connection between Leithart’s own
exegesis and that of the mediaevals (already quoted); the communal dimension of
reading—essentially a nod toward Tradition and the Church—that according to
Leithart might have been a chapter entitled ‘Texts Are Community Property’; and
the observation that literary ‘interpretation is ultimately a performance’,
like that of a musician interpreting a composer’s work. [32] He notes that much
more could be said about these things, but that all books must come to an end.
I have minor complaints, of course. As may be
guessed from my comments on Chapter 5, I had a low tolerance for Leithart’s
long illustrations taken from outside the discipline of hermeneutics. I also
found the incessant references to ‘Yahweh’ in the discussions of the OT and
Israel annoying. I realise that this has become a standard convention in ‘Hebrew
Bible’ studies, but I think it strikes the wrong note for a book advocating a ‘faithful’
and Christian reading of the OT. ‘Yahweh’ is not traditional Christian language
for the God of the OT—it is not found, for instance, in the traditional
liturgies and prayers, East or West, nor, more importantly, is it found in the
NT—and it is bound to seem artificial to the layman. Whether out of some fidelity
to the ancient Hebrew piety surrounding God’s name or not, is it an accident
that Christians have used ‘the Lord’ ever since the first century? I cannot
think so.
But more importantly I would insist that musings 1
and 2 from the epilogue really ought to have played some role in the text
itself. They are almost like an elephant in the room throughout the entire
book, and they are an emphasis with which modern Western Christianity (and sometimes, Eastern Christianity too!) could
really stand to be confronted a good deal more than it is. It is interesting
that the back cover of Leithart’s book contains blurbs from two authors who
have not failed to bring that emphasis to the fore: Reno, whose Sanctified
Vision I’ve already mentioned, and Fr Andrew Louth, whose brilliant Discerning
the Mystery makes many of the same points that Leithart does, but places them
firmly in the context of Tradition. [33] While I’m on the subject, it’s also
interesting that I do not recall Deep Exegesis insisting on the strict
distinction between typology and allegory found in Against Christianity, [34] a
distinction considerably looser in O’Keefe and Reno [35] and not present at
all, if I remember correctly, in Fr Louth. One wonders if Leithart has modified
earlier views, or simply decided not to make an issue of them.
Also, concerning Leithart’s central thesis about the
husk/kernel dichotomy, I must acknowledge some justice in an objection raised
by Wesley Hill in a review for Books & Culture (here):
In the eras of the church's defining Christological debates, it was not enough for the orthodox merely to attend to the Bible's words, phrases, sentences, and paragraphs, since the meaning of those biblical forms was precisely what was up for grabs. Simplifying the matter drastically, we might say that two opposing kernels (Nicene orthodoxy and Arian Christology) were claiming identical husks (the shared language of Scripture). Arguably, the triumph of orthodoxy depended on being able to grasp the right kernel (the Bible's message about the identity of Jesus) and fit it within a new, extra-biblical husk (the language of ousia). Ironically, given Leithart's argument, it was the biblical kernel itself that pressured its defenders to set aside the biblical husk for a moment and cast about for a new one.
Hill calls it ‘a
measure of the importance of Leithart’s study that it raises questions like
these’, but one really would like to have Leithart in the room, perhaps over a
pint of stout, to answer such questions immediately upon completion.
That said, this really is a much-needed book, I think.
Leithart’s attempts to critique Orthodoxy have been rightly and well-criticised
by other Orthodox, but in most respects I can’t help but think of him as an
ally.
[1] Peter Leithart, Against Christianity (Moscow,
ID: Canon, 2003). The pro-Constantinian theme and polemic with John Howard
Yoder and Stanley Hauerwas is present already in the latter book. Particularly
precious is Leithart’s parable about Hauerwas on the whole issue of
Constantinianism:
Once there was a prophet named Stanley. The prophet Stanley was a bold and faithful man who stood with granite face against the powers of the age.
‘you cannot do that s---t,’ he would say, as he stood before the king. ‘You are going to end up in ‘f-----g h---l, and your people are going to hate you.’
One day the king began to listen and to see the wisdom of Stanley’s words. When Stanley told him that the weak must be protected from the vicious strong, the king took steps to protect the weak. When Stanley told him that Jesus was Lord, the king bowed the knee. When Stanley told him that religious freedom is a subtle temptation, the king took heed.
And the king made a proclamation, that all in his kingdom should wear sackcloth and ashes and repent of their sins, even to the least beast of burden.
And Stanley went out from the city and made a shelter and sat under it and refused to speak again to the king.
And Stanley said, ‘Lord, please take my life from me, for death is better to me than life. I am a d---n prophet, not a f-----g chaplain.’
And the Lord said, ‘Do you have good reason to be angry?’
As for the king, he was greatly confounded and confused, and knew not what to do; for he had done all that Stanley had asked.
This parable ends with questions, not a moral: Will the king always refuse to listen? Says who? And, when the king begins to listen, must the Church fall silent, so as to avoid becoming a chaplain? To keep her integrity, must the Church refuse to succeed? (p. 148)
[2] Peter Leithart, Deep Exegesis: The Mystery of
Reading Scripture (Waco, TX: Baylor, 2009), p. 207.
[3] Ibid., p. vii.
[4] John J. O’Keefe & R.R. Reno, Sanctified
Vision: An Introduction to Early Christian Interpretation of the Bible
(Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins, 2005), p. 45.
[5] Leithart, Exegesis, pp. 32-3.
[6] See for example, O’Keefe & Reno, p. 74.
[7] Leithart, Exegesis, p. viii.
[8] Ibid., p. 10.
[9] Ibid., p. 34.
[10] Ibid., p. 2.
[11] Ibid., p. 8.
[12] Ibid., p. 39.
[13] Ibid., p. 41.
[14] Ibid., p. 44.
[15] Ibid., pp. 55-60.
[16] Ibid., pp. 66-7. I am in the process of reading
Steinmetz’s paper, ‘Uncovering a Second Narrative: Detective Fiction & the
Construction of Historical Method’, and hope to read a few others from this
volume before returning it to the library, particularly Brian Daley’s ‘Is
Patristic Exegesis Still Usable? Some Reflections on Early Christian
Interpretation of the Psalms’—Ellen F. Davis & Richard B. Hays, eds., The Art
of Reading Scripture (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2003), pp. 54-65, and 69-88.
[17] Leithart, Exegesis, p. 82.
[18] Unfortunately, this includes the supposedly
infallible Moises Silva!
[19] Ibid., p. 86.
[20] Ibid., p. 96.
[21] Ibid., p. 76, quoting Peter Cotterell and Max
Turner.
[22] Ibid., p. 81. Leithart even leaves in the ‘u’
of the second word. Sorry folks, I just couldn’t bring myself to do that on a
blog that just anyone could read! I am a little ashamed that Leithart has outcussed me.
[23] Ibid., p. 113.
[24] Ibid., pp. 119-24.
[25] Ibid., p. 133.
[26] Ibid., pp. 136-7.
[27] Ibid., p. 144.
[28] Ibid., pp. 181-8.
[29] Ibid., p. 193.
[30] Ibid., pp. 195-206.
[31] Ibid., p. 206.
[32] Ibid., p. 208. Leithart notes that he has
reflected on this more in ‘Authors, Authority, & the Humble Reader’, The
Christian Imagination: The Practice of Faith in Literature & Writing, rev.
& expanded ed., ed. Leland Ryken (Colorado Springs, CO: Shaw, 2005), pp.
209-24, which I read just today in a copy of the book graciously lent to me by
John Granger.
[33] See my review here.
[34] See Leithart, Christianity, p. 62, where he
claims, ‘At its best, then, typological interpretation is quite different from
allegory.’
[35] See O’Keefe & Reno, p. 90, where ‘Allegory
and typology are part of the same family of reading strategies’ whose ‘difference
lies in the amount of work the reader must put into the interpretation’.
No comments:
Post a Comment